

From Fatwa to Market: The Legitimacy of Religious Authority and Selective Compliance in the Boycott of Israel-Linked Products in Indonesia

Abdul Rachman,^{1*} Ibnu Hasan Muchtar,² Achmad Rosidi,² Retno Kartini Savitaningrum Imansah,² Bahiyah Ahmad³

¹Institute for Quranic Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia

²National Research and Innovation Agency, Jakarta, Indonesia

³Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

*Correspondence: abdulrachman@iiq.ac.id

Received: 10-09-2025 | Revised: 13-11-2025, 17-07-2026 | Accepted: 17-07-2026

Abstract

The Palestine–Israel conflict has transformed consumption into an arena of transnational solidarity through boycotts. However, how religious authority shapes consumer choices in Muslim societies and why normative legitimacy does not necessarily produce uniform compliance remain insufficiently explained. This article examines how Fatwa No. 83 of 2023, issued by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Ulama Council), gains social recognition and shapes consumer behavior, as well as why acceptance of this norm generates varied responses. The study employs a convergent parallel mixed-methods design, integrating a survey of 975 respondents across 13 cities and regencies, observations, in-depth interviews with 91 informants, and a focus group discussion involving 15 participants representing relevant stakeholders. The findings reveal that 74.2% of respondents often or always consider the fatwa in their consumption decisions, 92.5% perceive the fatwa as influencing their selectivity as consumers, and 94.8% express a preference for national products. However, recognition of the fatwa does not translate into uniform boycott practices. The translation of normative orientations into action is shaped by humanitarian solidarity, religious considerations, anticolonial nationalism, product price and quality, consumption habits, the availability of alternatives, and uncertainty regarding product affiliations. The findings also indicate a tendency to substitute alternative products, including national products, although they do not establish a causal relationship between the fatwa and changes in market share. Drawing on Max Weber's concept of legitimate authority, this article argues that the social efficacy of the fatwa lies in its socially recognized normative legitimacy and its capacity to orient consumption decisions, while its translation into action remains subject to interpretation and negotiation in everyday life. This article contributes to the study of Islamic law by demonstrating that the social efficacy of a fatwa as a non-state religious norm depends not primarily on the coercive power of state law but on its capacity to shape normative orientations without necessarily producing uniform compliance.

[Konflik Palestina–Israel telah menjadikan konsumsi sebagai arena solidaritas transnasional melalui praktik boikot. Namun, bagaimana otoritas keagamaan mengorientasikan pilihan konsumsi dalam masyarakat muslim dan mengapa legitimasi normatif tidak selalu menghasilkan kepatuhan yang beragam masih belum dijelaskan secara memadai. Artikel ini mengkaji bagaimana Fatwa Majelis

Ulama Indonesia (MUI) No. 83 Tahun 2023 memperoleh pengakuan sosial dan mengorientasikan perilaku konsumen, serta mengapa penerimaan terhadap norma tersebut menghasilkan respons yang beragam. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode campuran dengan desain konvergen paralel, yang mengintegrasikan survei terhadap 975 responden di 13 kabupaten/kota, observasi, wawancara mendalam dengan 91 informan, serta diskusi kelompok terarah dengan 15 orang yang terdiri dari berbagai pemangku kepentingan yang relevan. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa 74,2% responden sering atau selalu mempertimbangkan fatwa dalam keputusan konsumsi, 92,5% menilai fatwa memengaruhi selektivitas mereka sebagai konsumen, dan 94,8% menunjukkan preferensi terhadap produk nasional. Namun, pengakuan terhadap fatwa tidak diterjemahkan ke dalam praktik boikot yang seragam. Penerjemahan orientasi normatif ke dalam tindakan dibentuk oleh solidaritas kemanusiaan, pertimbangan keagamaan, nasionalisme anti kolonial, harga dan kualitas produk, kebiasaan konsumsi, ketersediaan alternatif, serta ketidakpastian informasi mengenai afiliasi produk. Temuan juga menunjukkan kecenderungan substitusi menuju produk alternatif, termasuk produk nasional, meskipun tidak membuktikan hubungan kausal antara fatwa dan perubahan pangsa pasar. Dengan menggunakan konsep legitimate authority Max Weber, artikel ini berargumentasi bahwa daya sosial fatwa terletak pada legitimasi normatif yang diakui secara sosial dan kapasitasnya mengorientasikan keputusan konsumsi, sementara penerjemahannya ke dalam tindakan tetap berlangsung melalui proses interpretasi dan negosiasi dalam kehidupan sehari-hari. Artikel ini berkontribusi pada studi hukum Islam dengan menunjukkan bahwa efektivitas sosial fatwa sebagai norma keagamaan non-negara tidak terutama bergantung pada daya paksa hukum negara, melainkan pada kapasitasnya membentuk orientasi normatif tanpa dengan sendirinya menghasilkan kepatuhan yang seragam.]

Keywords: Fatwa, Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Palestine–Israel Conflict, Political Consumerism, Religious Authority, Selective Compliance.

Introduction

The Palestine-Israel conflict has unfolded not only within the domains of diplomacy, international law, and interstate politics, but has also resonated in everyday life through various forms of transnational solidarity,¹ including boycotts and consumer choices. The escalation of violence and the humanitarian crisis in Palestine have generated public responses that connect consumption decisions with issues of justice, human rights, and moral responsibility.² Within the literature on political consumerism, purchasing (buycotting), refusing to purchase (boycotting), or shifting consumer preferences away from particular products for political, social, or ethical reasons are understood as a form of political participation exercised through market mechanisms.³ Consumption, therefore, is no longer

¹ Claudia Baumgart-Ochse, “Claiming Justice for Israel/Palestine: The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) Campaign and Christian Organizations,” *Globalizations* 14, no. 7 (November 2017): 1172–87; Abigail B. Bakan and Yasmeen Abu-Laban, “Palestinian Resistance and International Solidarity: The BDS Campaign,” *Race & Class* 51, no. 1 (July 2009): 29–54.

² Naiara Ozamiz-Etxebarria et al., “Resistance, Suffering and Political Critique: Social Representations of the Palestinian Conflict in Student Discourses,” *Social Sciences* 15, no. 7 (July 2026): 416; Astri Dwi Andriani and Irfan Sopha Himawan, “Global Brand Narratives Amidst Pro-Palestinian Boycotts: A Critical Discourse Analysis in Southeast Asia,” *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication* 41, no. 2 (2025): 384–404.

³ Lara J. Greening et al., “The Political Psychology Behind Consumer Decisions: The Complex Relationship Between Political Ideology and Political Consumerism,” *Journal of Consumer Behaviour* 25, no. 4 (2026): 2178–92; Ertem Gulen and Oguzhan Aygoren, “Understanding Political Consumerism, Political Participation, and Their Antecedents: Evidence from Turkey,” in *Research Anthology on Citizen Engagement and Activism for*

viewed merely as an economic activity, but also as a space in which values, identities, and political positions are articulated. In the context of Palestine, boycotting demonstrates how geopolitical concerns and transnational solidarity can be translated into everyday economic practices.⁴ Within Muslim societies, this process becomes more complex because consumer choices also intersect with religious norms and religious authority. The central academic question, therefore, is not merely whether consumers engage in boycotts, but rather how religious norms acquire legitimacy and normative force in shaping consumption practices that operate within the domain of individual choice and market mechanisms.

In the Indonesian context, this issue has taken a distinctive form through the issuance of Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Ulema Council) concerning the Legal Ruling on Supporting the Palestinian Struggle. The fatwa stipulates that supporting the struggle for Palestinian independence is obligatory, while supporting Israeli aggression or parties that support it, either directly or indirectly, is prohibited under Islamic law. In its recommendations, MUI further calls on Muslims to avoid, to the greatest extent possible, transactions involving and the use of products affiliated with Israel, as well as products that support colonialism and Zionism.⁵ Thus, the fatwa does not merely represent a religious-legal opinion on a geopolitical issue. It also brings consumption, economic activities, and market choices within the interpretive domain of Islamic law. The significance of this phenomenon lies in MUI's position as a non-state religious authority whose fatwas do not operate through the coercive mechanisms of state law,⁶ but may exert influence through religious legitimacy and social acceptance.⁷ Studies of ulama authority in Indonesia indicate that fatwas constitute one form of the articulation of religious authority in responding to social change and contemporary issues. Therefore, the MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 provides an important case for examining how religious authority is translated into social norms and economic practices and how such norms interact with consumer choices in everyday life.

The literature on MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 and consumer boycotts can be mapped into three relevant strands. First, studies on the legal construction of the fatwa examine how sources and methodologies of Islamic law are employed to establish the normative basis for

Social Change (IGI Global, 2021), 848–70; Christopher Starke and Ole Kelm, “Political Consumerism,” in *Elgar Encyclopedia of Political Communication* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2025), 3:212–15.

⁴ See: Rajesh Kumar et al., eds., *Geoeconomics of the Israel–Palestine Conflict: Governance, Global Trade, and Regional Dynamics* (London: Routledge, 2025); Bakan and Abu-Laban, “Palestinian Resistance and International Solidarity,” 29–54.

⁵ “Fatwa MUI No. 83 of 2023 on the Islamic Legal Ruling on Support for the Palestinian Struggle,” November 8, 2023.

⁶ Tim Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam: The Indonesian Ulama Council and State Regulation of the ‘Islamic Economy,’” *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 48, no. 2 (August 2012): 253–74.

⁷ Sigit Hardiyanto et al., “Analysis of the Fatwa of the Indonesian Ulama Council Supporting Halal Certification and the Progress of Indonesian Muslims,” *Pharos Journal of Theology* 105, no. 1 (2024): 1–11; Khairul Hamim, Lalu Supriadi Bin Mujib, and Ahmad Muhasim, “Religious Fatwā and Human Security: Managing Public Health through the Lens of Islamic Jurisprudence in Indonesia and Saudi Arabia,” *Khazanah Hukum* 6, no. 3 (2024): 234–50; Erni Budiwanti and Levi Geir Eidhamar, “The State and Religion in Indonesia: The Indonesian Ulama Council’s Authority on Public Health and National Lottery,” *Religions* 17, no. 1 (January 2026): 72.

supporting Palestine.⁸ Second, studies on the authority and social acceptance of the fatwa highlight the challenges that emerge when such norms enter social life. Amin et al. identify sociological problems at the level of implementation,⁹ while Witro finds that responses to products perceived as affiliated with Israel are shaped by the interplay of religious values, humanitarian solidarity, information, political awareness, and economic considerations.¹⁰ Third, studies on Muslim consumer boycotts demonstrate that boycott behavior cannot be reduced to religiosity or a single determinant. Sari et al. identify the multidimensional nature of Muslim consumer boycott behavior in Indonesia,¹¹ whereas Roswinanto and Suwanda demonstrate that religiosity contributes to religion-based boycotting while interacting with other factors that shape consumer attitudes and intentions.¹² This literature provides an important foundation for understanding that fatwas are grounded in legal reasoning, gain social acceptance, and interact with various considerations when translated into consumer practices. However, existing studies have not sufficiently explained how the legitimacy of fatwa-based religious authority shapes consumers' behavioral orientations. They also provide limited insight into why the acceptance of a religious norm leads to varying degrees of behavioral change.

Building on this gap, this article focuses on how fatwas acquire social effectiveness through legitimacy and why such legitimacy results in different forms of behavioral translation when norms enter the sphere of consumption and market mechanisms. The article employs Max Weber's concept of legitimate authority as its primary analytical framework to examine the relationship between the normative authority of the MUI, the recognition of the legitimacy of fatwas, and orientations toward action.¹³ Political consumerism is employed as a conceptual lens to interpret boycotts and shifts in product choices as forms of consumption that incorporate political, social, and ethical considerations.¹⁴ This article argues that MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 derives its social force not from the coercive mechanisms of state law, but from the normative legitimacy

⁸ Wahidul Anam and Mubaidi Sulaeman, "Law, Ethics, and Hadith Ahkam: An Analysis of Fatwa MUI in the Perspective of Progressive Interpretation," *Samarah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga dan Hukum Islam* 8, no. 2 (June 2024): 1023–53; Nabilah Tsuroya Basya, "Reading MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 on the Ruling of Supporting the Palestina: Maslahat Perspective," *Jurnal Mediasas: Media Ilmu Syari'ah dan Ahwal Al-Syakhsyiyah* 7, no. 1 (June 2024): 69–83; Fajar Rachmadhani, "An Analysis Study of the Fatwa Indonesia Ulama Council (MUI) on Boycotting Israel Products with the I'tibār al-Maalāt Theoretical Approach," *Journal of Fatwa Management and Research* 30, no. 3 (September 2025): 39–55.

⁹ Abd Rauf Muhammad Amin et al., "Problematic Fatwa: An In-Depth Sociological Investigation of MUI's Fatwa on Supporting Palestine's Struggle," *El-Usrah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga* 7, no. 1 (July 2024): 237–52.

¹⁰ Doli Witro, "State Islamic University Students' Perceptions of Israel Affiliated Products: A Study After the Fatwa of Indonesian Ulama Council No. 83 of 2023 Concerning the Law on Support for the Palestinian Struggle," *Al-Manahij: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam* 18, no. 1 (June 2024): 145–60.

¹¹ Dessy Kurnia Sari, Dick Mizerski, and Fang Liu, "Boycotting Foreign Products: A Study of Indonesian Muslim Consumers," *Journal of Islamic Marketing* 8, no. 1 (March 2017): 16–34.

¹² Widyarso Roswinanto and Siti Nuraisyah Suwanda, "Religious Boycott in Indonesia: Investigation of Antecedents and the Effect of Religiosity Dimensions," *Journal of Islamic Marketing* 14, no. 1 (August 2021): 174–95.

¹³ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Nachdr., vol. 2, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 212–16.

¹⁴ Dietlind Stolle, Marc Hooghe, and Michele Micheletti, "Politics in the Supermarket: Political Consumerism as a Form of Political Participation," *International Political Science Review* 26, no. 3 (July 2005): 245–69; Starke and Kelm, "Political Consumerism," 212–15.

recognized by society. This legitimacy transforms solidarity with Palestine into an orientation toward political consumerism. However, its behavioral translation remains selective because it is negotiated through interpretations of the objects of the boycott, material conditions, consumption habits, the availability of alternatives, and the reliability of information. Consequently, the fatwa does not produce uniform compliance. Instead, it generates variations in consumer behavior while simultaneously reorienting preferences toward alternative products. Accordingly, this article aims to explain how the legitimacy of MUI authority, as expressed through Fatwa No. 83 of 2023, orients consumption practices and why recognition of the norm produces different degrees of behavioral translation among consumers. The principal contribution of this article is to demonstrate that the social force of a fatwa cannot be adequately assessed solely through the binary distinction between compliance and non-compliance. Rather, it should be understood in terms of its capacity to shape normative orientations that become incorporated into decision-making processes, even when the resulting behaviors differ across consumers.

Research Methodology

This study employs a mixed-methods approach with a convergent parallel design to integrate quantitative and qualitative data in examining the relationship between the normative authority of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 and community consumption practices.¹⁵ This design was selected because the research object involves not only consumer tendencies and response patterns that can be quantitatively mapped, but also how individuals understand and interpret the fatwa, negotiate religious norms with their socio-economic conditions, and translate these norms into consumption practices. The study was conducted from March to April 2025 across thirteen regencies and municipalities in Indonesia: Surabaya City, Special Capital Region of Jakarta, Bandung City, Tangerang City, South Tangerang City, Bekasi City, Depok City, Serang City, Bogor City, Cirebon City, Cirebon Regency, Kuningan Regency, and Majalengka Regency. The study areas were selected purposively by considering variations in the geographical, demographic, and socio-economic characteristics of the population. Given these characteristics, the study does not seek to produce statistical generalizations for the entire Indonesian population. Rather, it aims to identify patterns and explain variations in people's experiences, interpretations, and responses to the fatwa within the social contexts under examination.

Quantitative data were collected through an electronic questionnaire distributed online using Google Forms across the thirteen research areas. The research instrument employed a four-point Likert scale and involved 975 respondents aged 17-56 years. Respondents were selected using non-probability sampling with a purposive sampling technique based on the predetermined inclusion criteria of the study. Qualitative data were obtained through observation and in-depth interviews with 91 informants across the thirteen research areas. Each research area involved seven informants representing Muslim and non-Muslim members of the general public, Muslim and non-Muslim business actors, distributors or

¹⁵ John W. Creswell and Vicki L. Plano Clark, *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2018), 64–70.

agents, and representatives of business associations or organizations. Two members of the Muslim general public were selected from each research area, while each of the other categories was represented by one informant. This composition was designed to capture diverse perspectives on the acceptance of the fatwa, consumption and business practices, and the factors influencing the translation of the fatwa's normative provisions into action.

Table 1
Distribution of Informants by Category

Informant Category	Number
Muslim members of the general public	26
Non-Muslim members of the general public	13
Muslim business actors	13
Non-Muslim business actors	13
Distributors or agents	13
Representatives of business associations or organizations	13
Total	91

Source: Compiled by the authors from field data, 2025.

In addition to interviews and observations, this study also utilized data from a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) held on 17 April 2025 at the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) in Jakarta. The FGD involved 15 participants from various stakeholder groups, including ISS, representing the Director General of Domestic Trade at the Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia; ZR, a member of the MUI Advisory Council; SDR, a professor at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta; HA, Deputy Chairman for the Restaurant Sector of the Indonesian Hotel and Restaurant Association (PHRI); HI, representing a bottled drinking water producer; one representative of the Indonesian Bottled Drinking Water Producers Association (ASPARMINAS); one representative of Statistics Indonesia (BPS); one representative of the National Amil Zakat Agency (BAZNAS); one representative from the Assistant Deputy for Production and Downstream Development of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs); and six participants from the Indonesia Halal Watch (IHW). The diversity of FGD participants enabled the study to bring together perspectives from religious authorities, government institutions, academics, business actors and associations, and civil society organizations. This diversity provided a broader basis for examining how the fatwa's normative provisions are received, interpreted, negotiated, and translated into social and consumption practices.

Data analysis was conducted by integrating quantitative and qualitative findings in accordance with the characteristics of the convergent parallel design. Quantitative data were analyzed descriptively to identify patterns in respondents' considerations regarding MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023, tendencies toward product boycotts and substitution, and preferences for domestic products. Data obtained from interviews, observations, and the FGD were analyzed thematically to identify patterns of meaning, motives, considerations, and social contexts underlying variations in community responses.¹⁶ The two types of data were

¹⁶ Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology," *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3, no. 2 (January 2006): 77–101.

subsequently converged at the interpretation stage by comparing, connecting, and reading quantitative patterns and qualitative findings in a complementary manner. This process was intended to explain how religious authority gains recognition and how the normative orientations generated by the fatwa are translated into consumption behavior. All findings were then analyzed using Weber's concept of legitimate authority as the primary analytical framework, particularly his conception of legitimacy as the basis through which a relationship of authority gains recognition and orients action.¹⁷ In this study, the concept was operationalized through three interrelated dimensions: the basis of MUI's legitimacy as a religious authority, public recognition of the fatwa as a normative guide, and the translation of this normative orientation into consumption behavior. This framework was used to demonstrate that recognition of the legitimacy of authority does not necessarily produce uniform behavioral compliance. The translation of norms into action occurs through processes of interpretation and negotiation with varying social, economic, material, and informational conditions. Accordingly, MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 is understood not merely as a text of Islamic law, but as a non-state religious norm that derives its social force from legitimacy and recognition. Its translation into action, however, continues to take place through processes of negotiation in everyday life.

MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 as a Religious Normative Authority

The MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 on the Law Governing Support for the Palestinian Struggle was issued against the backdrop of escalating violence and the humanitarian crisis in Palestine, alongside growing solidarity with the Palestinian people in Indonesia.¹⁸ In its considerations, the MUI identifies Israeli aggression, civilian casualties, and various forms of support for Israel as issues requiring a religious response. The fatwa also responds to public inquiries concerning the Islamic legal status of supporting the Palestinian struggle, including through humanitarian assistance and economic actions. Thus, the Palestinian issue is not framed merely as a geopolitical matter beyond the scope of Islamic law, but rather as an issue requiring normative guidance for Muslims. This response was subsequently institutionalized through the MUI Fatwa Commission and formally issued in Jakarta on November 8, 2023.¹⁹ This process demonstrates that a fatwa is an institutional product arising from the interaction between global sociopolitical developments, society's need for religious guidance, and MUI's authority to provide legal responses to contemporary issues.²⁰ In the Indonesian context, this position is consistent with the development of fatwas as an important medium through

¹⁷ Weber, *Economy and Society*, 2:212–16.

¹⁸ “Fatwa Terbaru MUI Nomor 83 Tahun 2023: Mendukung Agresi Israel ke Palestina Hukumnya Haram,” Majelis Ulama Indonesia, November 10, 2023, <https://mui.or.id/baca/berita/fatwa-terbaru-mui-nomor-83-tahun-2023-mendukung-agresi-israel-ke-palestina-hukumnya-haram>.

¹⁹ “Fatwa MUI No. 83 of 2023 on the Islamic Legal Ruling on Support for the Palestinian Struggle.”

²⁰ Danil Putra Arisandy, Asmuni, and Muhammad Syukri Albani Nasution, “The Majelis Ulama’s Fatwa on Freedom of Expression on Social Media: The Perspective of Maqashid Sharia,” *Al-Istinbath: Jurnal Hukum Islam* 7, no. 2 (2022): 467–86; Ahmad Izudin, “Green Fatwa Studies in Global Discourses: Trends and Pathways for the Sustainable Development Agenda,” *Ajy-Syir’ab: Jurnal Ilmu Syari’ah dan Hukum* 60, no. 1 (May 2026): 1–25.

which ulama and religious institutions articulate religious authority in responding to social change.²¹

Substantively, MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 draws an important distinction between legal rulings and recommendations. In its legal provisions, the MUI stipulates that supporting the Palestinian struggle for independence in response to Israeli aggression is obligatory. Such support may be expressed, among other means, through the distribution of *ṣakāh* (obligatory almsgiving), *infāq* (charitable spending), and *ṣadaqah* (voluntary charity) for the benefit of the Palestinian people's struggle. The fatwa also permits the distribution of *ṣakāh* to eligible recipients (*mustahiq*) outside the geographical area of the *ṣakāh* payer (*muṣakki*) in circumstances involving emergencies or urgent needs. Conversely, supporting Israeli aggression against Palestine or supporting parties that support Israel, whether directly or indirectly, is declared prohibited (*ḥarām*). In its recommendations, the MUI calls on Muslims to support the Palestinian struggle through humanitarian and solidarity fundraising, prayer, and *ṣalāt al-ghā'ib* (funeral prayer in absentia) for those regarded as martyrs. It also urges the Indonesian government to pursue diplomatic measures through the United Nations, provide humanitarian assistance, and consolidate support among member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. In the economic sphere, the MUI recommends that Muslims make every effort to avoid transactions with and the use of products affiliated with Israel, as well as products that support colonialism and Zionism.²² This framework establishes a spectrum of support encompassing philanthropic, spiritual, diplomatic, and economic dimensions, with consumption practices serving as one of the means through which solidarity with Palestine is expressed and actualized.

The legal reasoning underlying MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 is constructed through four layers of legal sources and arguments: the Qur'an, hadith, Islamic legal maxims (*qawā'id fiqhīyyah*), and the opinions of Islamic scholars (*'ulamā'*). At the first level, the fatwa refers to ten Qur'anic verses concerning, among other matters, the prohibition of causing destruction and killing, the defense of those subjected to oppression and expulsion, the command to cooperate (*ta'āwun*) in righteousness, and the provision of material support. At the second level, seven hadith are cited to reinforce the principles prohibiting harm and injustice, the ethics of warfare, the defense of those who are fought against or expelled, and the obligation of solidarity among fellow Muslims. These arguments are further reinforced by several legal maxims, including the obligation to eliminate harm, the prioritization of greater public benefit when competing interests conflict, the principle of choosing the lesser harm when multiple harms cannot be avoided, and the principle that policies adopted by those in authority toward the community must be oriented toward the public interest (*maṣlahah*). The MUI further draws on the views of several *'ulamā'*. These include al-Sayyid al-Bakri and Zain bin Ibrahim bin Zain bin Sumaith on the permissibility of transferring *ṣakāh* under certain circumstances; Imam al-Nawawi on transactions that assist those who fight against Muslims;

²¹ Sanuri Sanuri et al., "A Maslahah-Based Review of MUI's Fatwa on Cryptocurrency: A Cognizant Human Perspective," *Syariah: Jurnal Hukum dan Pemikiran* 25, no. 1 (July 2025): 43–66; Muhammad Fauzinudin Faiz et al., "Fatwa and the Sound Horeg Question: Contesting Rights, Noise, and Social Order in East Java, Indonesia," *Al-'Adalah* 23, no. 1 (June 2026): 121–46.

²² "Fatwa MUI No. 83 of 2023 on the Islamic Legal Ruling on Support for the Palestinian Struggle."

Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rahman bin Muhammad Ba‘Alawi on transactions when it is known that the goods being traded will be used for prohibited purposes; Said Ramadan al-Buti on economic boycotts as a form of resistance to aggression; and Ibn al-Hajj al-Fasi al-Maliki on restrictions on commercial transactions in situations of conflict.²³ This structure of reasoning demonstrates that the MUI does not formulate the fatwa solely through a textual reading of *naṣṣ* (authoritative text). Rather, it integrates textual sources, legal maxims, considerations of *maṣlaḥah*, and scholarly opinions to construct a normative foundation for supporting Palestine and restricting economic activities considered to contribute to aggression.²⁴

The structure of legal provisions, recommendations, and legal reasoning demonstrates that MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 extends beyond the conventional function of a fatwa as a legal response to individual questions. It translates an issue unfolding within the international geopolitical arena into actionable orientations in everyday life, ranging from *ṣukāḥ* and humanitarian assistance to economic transactions and consumer choices. From a socio-legal perspective, the normative force of a fatwa does not primarily depend on its capacity to compel compliance through state-imposed legal sanctions. Rather, it depends on the capacity of religious authority to formulate normative guidance that gains social recognition.²⁵ MUI’s position cannot, however, be reduced to that of an institution operating entirely outside the state. The formation and development of its authority have taken place through complex institutional relations involving the state, Muslim society, and various regulatory arenas, including the Islamic economic sector.²⁶ Nevertheless, in the context of Fatwa No. 83 of 2023, the absence of coercive mechanisms requiring the public to follow its recommendations concerning consumption makes recognition of the legitimacy of MUI and its fatwa an important determinant of the norm’s social efficacy.²⁷ Accordingly, the significance of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 lies in its capacity to bring together institutional legitimacy, Islamic legal reasoning, and the orientation of social action.

Legitimacy and Public Acceptance of Fatwa Authority

The issuance of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 generated diverse responses among the public. The findings of this study indicate that this diversity cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy between acceptance and rejection of the fatwa. The data reveal at least three patterns of public response: active support, passive support, and neutrality. Those who actively support the fatwa not only express agreement with its substantive provisions but also seek to translate

²³ “Fatwa MUI No. 83 of 2023 on the Islamic Legal Ruling on Support for the Palestinian Struggle.”

²⁴ Anam and Sulaeman, “Law, Ethics, and Hadith Ahkam,” 1023–53; Basya, “Reading MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 on The Ruling of Supporting the Palestina,” 69–83.

²⁵ Nico J. G. Kaptein, “The Voice of the ‘Ulamā’: Fatwas and Religious Authority in Indonesia,” *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 125 (2004): 115–30; Muniron Muniron, Fidia Astuti, and Faiz Marikar, “Lived Social Sufism beyond Institutions: Non-Institutional Charismatic Authority in Contemporary Indonesian Islam,” *Religions: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama dan Lintas Budaya* 9, no. 3 (December 2025): 257–72.

²⁶ Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam,” 253–74; Jefik Zulfikar Hafizd et al., “Reassessing Justice in Murabahah Regulation in Indonesia through Sayyid Qutb’s Perspective,” *International Journal of Islamic Khaṣṣanah* 16, no. 1 (June 2026): 36–54.

²⁷ Abdurrohman Kasdi et al., “Fatwa and Religious Authority: Islamic Law, Social Media Ethics and Digital Age,” *Al-Ahkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syari’ah dan Hukum* 11, no. 1 (March 2026): 56–66; Setiawan bin Lahuri et al., “A Normative Analysis of DSN-MUI Fatwa No. 154/DSN-MUI/V/2023 and Its Implications for Sharia ETF Governance in Indonesia,” *Al-Muamalat* 13, no. 1 (March 2026): 50–75.

them into consumption practices by avoiding products perceived to be affiliated with Israel and seeking alternative products. Those who passively support the fatwa generally accept its moral objectives and express solidarity with Palestine, but do not necessarily treat the fatwa as a primary consideration or apply it consistently in their consumption choices. Meanwhile, the neutral group is aware of the existence of the fatwa but does not regard it as a primary guideline in either consumption activities or business practices. These variations in attitudes indicate that public acceptance of the fatwa occurs at different degrees and does not necessarily correspond directly to changes in behavior. This finding is consistent with previous studies showing a predominantly supportive public response to fatwa authority, while also demonstrating that perceptions of products considered to be affiliated with Israel are shaped by the interaction of religious values, solidarity with Palestine, media information, economic considerations, and political awareness.²⁸

Table 2
Patterns of Public Acceptance of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023

Response Pattern	Characteristics
Active Support	Accepts the fatwa and translates it into consumption practices through greater selectivity, avoidance of products perceived to be affiliated with Israel, and the selection of alternative products.
Passive Support	Accepts the normative objectives of the fatwa, but its application in consumption practices is limited or inconsistent due to considerations of price, quality, availability of alternatives, consumption habits, and other practical factors.
Neutrality	Is aware of the existence of the fatwa but does not regard it as a primary consideration in consumption decisions or business activities. Choices are primarily based on needs, preferences, and market conditions.

Source: Survey data processed by the authors, 2025.


The typology presented in Table 2 demonstrates that social acceptance of a fatwa is better understood as a spectrum of acceptance rather than as a binary relationship between acceptance and rejection. An individual may accept the moral substance of a fatwa without implementing all of its recommendations, just as an individual may avoid certain products out of humanitarian solidarity without considering religious obligation to be the primary basis for doing so. This distinction is important because the study includes both Muslim and non-Muslim participants. For Muslims, the fatwa has normative relevance because MUI is regarded as possessing religious authority to provide guidance on issues affecting the Muslim community. For some non-Muslim participants, by contrast, support for Palestine and decisions to avoid certain products are understood primarily in terms of humanitarian and justice considerations rather than as an obligation to follow the fatwa. This finding indicates that the social resonance of a fatwa may extend beyond the community that is directly addressed by its normative authority, even though the basis of acceptance may differ across groups. Accordingly, the social force of a fatwa derives not only from MUI’s institutional

²⁸ Prihandono Wibowo, Renitha Dwi Hapsari, and Muchammad Chasif Ascha, “Respon Publik Terhadap Fatwa Boikot Produk Israel Oleh Majelis Ulama Indonesia,” *Journal Publicubo* 7, no. 1 (March 2024): 382–95; Witro, “State Islamic University Students’ Perceptions of Israel Affiliated Products,” 145–60.

position but also from the capacity of its normative substance to gain recognition and resonate with moral values embedded within society.²⁹

The quantitative findings further reinforce this pattern. As shown in Diagram 1, 38.4% of respondents reported that they “often” consider MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 when purchasing products, while 35.8% reported that they “always” consider it. Collectively, 74.2% of the 975 respondents in this study indicated that they often or always take the fatwa into account in their consumption decisions. Meanwhile, 21.0% of respondents reported that they consider it “sometimes,” while 4.8% stated that they “never” consider it. These findings do not necessarily mean that 74.2% of respondents consistently comply with the recommendations of the fatwa or systematically engage in boycotts. Rather, the data indicate something more specific: the fatwa has become one of the normative references considered by a substantial proportion of respondents in their consumption decision-making processes. This distinction is important because recognition of normative authority is not equivalent to implementation of all the norms derived from it. Within the framework of legitimate authority, belief in the legitimacy of an authority may shape orientations toward action, while the form and degree of empirical compliance may nevertheless vary.³⁰

Figure 1
Consideration of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 in Consumer Decision-Making



Source: Survey data processed by the authors, 2025.


This tendency is consistent with the findings concerning respondents’ perceptions of the role of the fatwa in increasing selectivity in product choice. A total of 56.5% of respondents agreed, while 36.0% strongly agreed that MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 influenced them in choosing products. Conversely, 6.3% disagreed and 1.2% strongly disagreed. Thus, cumulatively, 92.5% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the fatwa influenced their selectivity in product selection. While Figure 1 indicates the frequency with which the fatwa enters into consumers’ considerations, Figure 2 illustrates respondents’ assessment of the

²⁹ Kaptein, “The Voice of the ‘Ulamâ’,” 115–30; Muhammad Alim Ihsan, Sakaruddin Mandjarreki, and Suparman Suparman, “Religion as Moral Infrastructure: Lived Islam, Welfare Governance, and the Family Hope Program in Indonesia,” *Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama dan Lintas Budaya* 9, no. 3 (December 2025): 347–64.

³⁰ Weber, *Economy and Society*, 2:212–15.

relevance of the fatwa to their selectivity in product choice. These two findings complement each other by demonstrating that the fatwa has entered consumers' normative decision-making processes. Nevertheless, these data cannot be interpreted as evidence of a causal relationship in which the fatwa directly produces changes in consumption behavior. Rather, they can be interpreted as an indication that acceptance of the fatwa is associated with greater attention among respondents to the normative dimension of product selection.³¹

Figure 2
Respondents' Perceptions of the Influence of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 on Product Selection Selectivity



Source: Survey data processed by the authors, 2025.

Acceptance of fatwa authority, however, takes place within an information environment that does not always provide certainty regarding the objects that should be avoided. Interviews and FGD findings indicate that a recurring challenge is the difficulty faced by the public in identifying products that are genuinely affiliated with Israel or that provide support for Israeli aggression.³² This difficulty is compounded by the circulation of product lists through social media whose sources and underlying criteria cannot always be verified.³³ This finding is consistent with the study by Husna et al., which shows that uncertainty regarding the products targeted for boycott creates public confusion and increases the risk of misidentifying products as being associated with Israel.³⁴ A similar concern has been raised by several scholars who have highlighted the problem of defining clear criteria for implementing MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023.³⁵ This issue was also

³¹ Yuli Andriansyah, "Analysis of Fatwas by the National Sharia Board-Indonesian Council of Ulama on the Stock Market," *Millab: Journal of Religious Studies* 22, no. 2 (2023): 525–52.

³² Interviews with Muslim community members in Surabaya, Jakarta Special Capital Region, Bandung, Tangerang, South Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok, Serang, Bogor, Cirebon City, Cirebon Regency, Kuningan Regency, and Majalengka Regency, March 10–20, 2025.

³³ SDR, "Professor at UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Statement during a Focus Group Discussion," (Jakarta), April 17, 2025. See also: Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital, "[HOAKS] Rilis Daftar 121 Produk Yang Diharamkan MUI Karena Terafiliasi Israel," November 17, 2023, <https://www.komdigi.go.id/berita/berita-hoaks/detail/hoaks-rilis-daftar-121-produk-yang-diharamkan-mui-karena-terafiliasi-israel>.

³⁴ Nurul Husna et al., "Public Chaos: Alleged Fatwa on Boycotting and the Fear of Missing Out on Israeli Products in Indonesia," *AHKAM: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah* 25, no. 1 (December 2025): 143–58.

³⁵ Amin et al., "Problematic Fatwa," 237–52; Nadia, Ahmad Arif, and Juraev Abror Turobovich, "Sharia Legal Certainty in Boycotts: Assessing the Implications of Fatwas on Socio-Economic Justice," *Mazhabuna: Jurnal Perbandingan Mazhab* 7, no. 1 (2025): 19–37.

acknowledged by the Director General of Domestic Trade at the Indonesian Ministry of Trade, who explained that the government does not establish a list of products affiliated with Israel because clear definitions and criteria of affiliation are required to prevent inaccurate information from circulating and to avoid potential losses for companies that have no actual connection to Israel as alleged.³⁶ At the same forum, a representative of the MUI emphasized that MUI's authority lies in issuing fatwas, rather than determining lists of companies or products affiliated with Israel.³⁷ These findings reveal a gap between acceptance of the normative principle and certainty regarding the objects to which it applies. The public may accept the normative objectives of the fatwa while simultaneously facing uncertainty when determining which products are relevant to its recommendations.

Taken together, these findings demonstrate that the legitimacy and public acceptance of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 operate across several interconnected but distinct layers. First, there is recognition of the MUI as an institution possessing religious authority to provide normative orientation to Muslims. Second, there is acceptance of the moral substance of the fatwa, particularly solidarity with Palestine and opposition to support for aggression, which under certain circumstances also resonates among non-Muslim members of the public. Third, there is a willingness to incorporate the fatwa into consumption considerations, as reflected in the 74.2% of respondents who reported that they often or always take it into account and the 92.5% who agreed or strongly agreed that the fatwa influences their selectivity in product selection. However, these three layers do not produce uniform forms of action. Recognition of the fatwa may exist without full implementation of its recommendations, while the practice of avoiding certain products may also be motivated by humanitarian, political, or ethical considerations without being entirely driven by religious obligation. Thus, legitimacy and compliance are related but distinct dimensions.³⁸ Nevertheless, the capacity of a fatwa to shape orientations toward action does not eliminate the role of individual interpretation, personal considerations, or the social conditions surrounding its implementation.³⁹

From Normative Authority to Political Consumerism: Motives and Practices of Boycotting

Acceptance of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023, as demonstrated in the preceding section, does not stop at recognition of MUI's normative authority but, in a number of cases, is translated into consumption practices. The findings indicate that some members of the public have become more selective in choosing products, reduced or discontinued purchases of products perceived to be affiliated with Israel, and shifted toward alternative products. These practices

³⁶ ISS, "Director General of Domestic Trade, Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia, Statement during a Focus Group Discussion," (Jakarta), April 17, 2025.


³⁷ SAH, "Chair of the MUI Commission for Foreign Relations and International Cooperation, Statement during a Focus Group Discussion," (Jakarta), April 17, 2025.

³⁸ Weber, *Economy and Society*, 2:212–16.

³⁹ Shaheen Whyte, "Are Fatwas Dispensable? Examining the Contemporary Relevance and Authority of Fatwas in Australia," *Oxford Journal of Law and Religion* 11, nos. 2–3 (October 2022): 314–42; Ilda Hayati et al., "Contextualizing Fatwas amid Social Change: A Maqasid-Based Comparative Framework of Legal Reasoning in MUI, Muhammadiyah, and Nahdlatul Ulama," *Al-Istinbath: Jurnal Hukum Islam* 11, no. 2 (2026): 494–522.

suggest that consumption is no longer determined solely by price, quality, availability, and habitual preferences, but has also acquired moral and political dimensions. In the literature on political consumerism, boycotting or boycotting particular products on political, social, or ethical grounds is understood as a form of political participation through the market.⁴⁰ In this sense, boycotting can be understood as a form of political consumerism in which consumers use everyday economic decisions to express positions on political issues that extend beyond the geographical context in which they live. However, in the context of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023, such practices are more complex because political and humanitarian considerations intersect with religious norms. The fatwa provides a normative framework through which solidarity with Palestine can be translated from a moral stance into one of the orientations guiding consumption decisions.⁴¹

Figure 3
Motivations for Supporting the Boycott Following the Issuance of
MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023



Source: Survey data processed by the authors, 2025.

The findings indicate that the translation of this normative orientation into action is not driven by a single motive. Based on the research data, five recurring motivations emerged from informants' explanations of their decisions to support or participate in the boycott: humanitarian solidarity, religious considerations, anti-colonial nationalism, health considerations, and dislike. As shown in Figure 3, humanitarian solidarity was the most prominent motivation in the informants' narratives. This motivation was identified among both Muslim and non-Muslim informants and primarily stemmed from concern for civilian victims, the suffering of the Palestinian people, and opposition to violence and injustice.

⁴⁰ Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti, "Politics in the Supermarket," 245–69; Cindy D. Kam and Maggie Deichert, "Boycotting, Buycotting, and the Psychology of Political Consumerism," *The Journal of Politics* 82, no. 1 (January 2020): 72–88.

⁴¹ Fawes Samudra, Akhmad Roja Badrus Zaman, and Digdo Aji Mukti, "Reviving the Essence of Jihad in the Contemporary Era: Advocating Struggle and Solidarity for Palestine Through Boycott of Pro-Israel Products," *MILRev: Metro Islamic Law Review* 3, no. 1 (April 2024): 22–42; Nadia, Arif, and Turobovich, "Sharia Legal Certainty in Boycotts," 19–37.

Religious considerations were more prominent among Muslim informants, particularly when solidarity with Palestine was understood as part of their responsibility toward fellow Muslims and the fatwa's recommendations were regarded as guidance for consumption choices. Meanwhile, anti-colonial nationalism emerged when support for Palestine was connected to Indonesia's historical and constitutional position against colonialism. The other two motivations, namely health and dislike, were more individual in nature and indicate that decisions to participate in the boycott may intersect with pre-existing considerations regarding health, product preferences, or negative evaluations of particular brands. This diversity indicates that boycott practices cannot be adequately explained solely as forms of religious compliance with the fatwa. Rather, such practices emerge from the intersection of religious norms, humanitarian solidarity, political identity, and individual considerations.⁴²

The prominence of humanitarian solidarity as one of the key motivations indicates that the social efficacy of the fatwa is not confined to religious identity and obligation. For Muslim informants, solidarity with Palestine may intersect with religious bonds and understandings of responsibility toward fellow Muslims.⁴³ In a broader context, research on religion-based boycotts in Indonesia also shows that religiosity can contribute to the formation of consumer boycott intentions.⁴⁴ However, the findings of this study demonstrate that humanitarian considerations can provide a basis for action that crosses religious identity boundaries. Among some non-Muslim informants who supported avoiding certain products, their decisions were not based on an obligation to follow the MUI fatwa, but rather on assessments of the suffering of the Palestinian people, justice, and opposition to violence.⁴⁵ The fatwa therefore operates within a social space in which religious and humanitarian arguments can converge without becoming identical. This finding resonates with Witro's research, which demonstrates that perceptions of products regarded as affiliated with Israel are shaped through the interaction of religious values, humanitarian solidarity with Palestine, media information, economic considerations, and political awareness.⁴⁶ This suggests that the social reach of a fatwa does not necessarily expand through acceptance of the religious obligation itself, but may also develop through the resonance between the normative message conveyed by the fatwa and moral values that enjoy broader social acceptance.

Anti-colonial nationalism constitutes another layer of motivation that brings transnational solidarity into dialogue with national political identity. In several interviews, support for Palestine was understood not as being incompatible with Indonesian nationalism

⁴² Rina Herani, "When Authority Stays Mute, What Drives the Substitute? Investigating Youth Voluntary Compliance with a Fatwa amid Geopolitical Tensions," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, December 23, 2025, 1–23; Mohd Azmi Khan and Amgad S. D. Khaled, "Religion-Based Boycott Behavior through the Lens of the Theory of Planned Behavior: Insights from Gen Z Muslims," *Cogent Business & Management* 13, no. 1 (June 2026): 2689830.

⁴³ Interviews with Muslim community members and Muslim business actors in Surabaya, Jakarta Special Capital Region, Bandung, Tangerang, South Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok, Serang, Bogor, Cirebon City, Cirebon Regency, Kuningan Regency, and Majalengka Regency, March 10–20, 2025.

⁴⁴ Roswinanto and Suwanda, "Religious Boycott in Indonesia," 174–95.

⁴⁵ Interviews with non-Muslim business actors, distributors, and representatives of business associations in Surabaya, Jakarta Special Capital Region, Bandung, Tangerang, South Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok, Serang, Bogor, Cirebon City, Cirebon Regency, Kuningan Regency, and Majalengka Regency, March 10–20, 2025.

⁴⁶ Witro, "State Islamic University Students' Perceptions of Israel Affiliated Products," 145–60.

but, rather, as being justified through the historical narrative of Indonesia as a nation opposed to colonialism.⁴⁷ The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD 1945) affirms that “colonialism in all its forms must be abolished from the world” because it is contrary to humanity and justice. Within the context of the research findings, this principle provides a political vocabulary through which support for Palestine can be understood simultaneously as an expression of transnational solidarity and as an articulation of the anti-colonial values embedded in Indonesian national identity. Thus, religion and nationalism do not necessarily operate as mutually exclusive sources of motivation. They may converge in moral assessments of the Palestine–Israel conflict and subsequently find practical expression through consumption decisions. Boycotting, in this configuration, becomes an economic action through which consumers connect religious identity, humanitarian solidarity, and anti-colonial principles with choices made in everyday life.⁴⁸

The translation of the norm into action does not occur individually or spontaneously. The research data indicate the role of religious figures and religious organizations in disseminating MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 through sermons, religious study sessions, organizational activities, and social media. The MUI Advisory Council explained that dissemination by religious figures has contributed to strengthening public support for the boycott by connecting it with humanitarian solidarity and the Palestinian struggle.⁴⁹ These findings demonstrate that the fatwa gains social reach through intermediary actors who translate the language of Islamic legal norms into narratives that are more closely connected to people’s everyday experiences. Mosques, religious study sessions, religious organizations, and social networks thus serve as spaces in which the normative message of the fatwa is communicated, interpreted, and connected to consumption practices. Accordingly, the fatwa does not move linearly from text to behavior. Between the two lies a process of socialization, interpretation, and mediation through which a normative provision acquires practical meaning in everyday life. This characteristic underscores that the social efficacy of a fatwa cannot be understood solely from its legal text, but also from the social networks through which its normative message is conveyed, interpreted, and reproduced.⁵⁰

Digital media constitute another important arena in this process of translation. The research data indicate that some informants obtained information about products considered to be affiliated with Israel through social media, the internet, and various sources of

⁴⁷ ZR, “Member of the MUI Advisory Council, Statement during a Focus Group Discussion,” (Jakarta), April 17, 2025.

⁴⁸ Khan and Khaled, “Religion-Based Boycott Behavior through the Lens of the Theory of Planned Behavior,” 2689830; Leen Adel Gammoh, Nadine Khair, and Rand Gammoh, “Consumer Boycotts, Ethical Risk and Cultural Resistance: A Sustainability Perspective on Western Fast-Food Consumption in Jordan,” *Management and Sustainability*, 2026, 1–25; Nurul Ichsan, Rakha Mulia Gymnastiar, and Maria Zehra, “Review of the Success of Collecting Donations for Palestine through Kitabisa.Com,” *Al-Muamalat* 12, no. 1 (April 2025): 198–210.

⁴⁹ ZR, “Member of the MUI Advisory Council, Statement during a Focus Group Discussion,” (Jakarta), April 17, 2025.

⁵⁰ Mohammad Bachrul Falah and Riyanta Riyanta, “Digital Patriarchy: How Indonesian Islamic Preachers Construct Gender Asymmetry through YouTube Fatwas,” *Al-Ahwal: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga Islam* 18, no. 1 (June 2025): 103–22; Kaptein, “The Voice of the ‘Ulamā’,” 115–30.

information concerning the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement.⁵¹ The circulation of information through digital media enables the Palestinian issue to enter everyday consumption spaces rapidly and extends the reach of boycott messages beyond formal religious communication channels. However, the role of digital media in this process is ambivalent. On the one hand, social media increases public exposure to the situation in Palestine, expands access to information about boycott campaigns, and facilitates the exchange of information about alternative products. On the other hand, information concerning the affiliation of particular products does not always originate from verifiable sources, thereby creating the possibility of misinformation and erroneous identification of boycott targets.⁵² Digital media therefore function not only as channels for disseminating the message of the fatwa but also as arenas in which meanings concerning product affiliation, corporate responsibility, and the legitimacy of particular products as boycott targets are produced and contested.⁵³ Accordingly, the rise of political consumerism stems from the interplay among the fatwa's normative framework, the interpretations of religious actors, the circulation of digital information, and consumer evaluations.

The findings of this study demonstrate that boycott practices following the issuance of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 constitute forms of consumption behavior characterized by multiple layers of motivation. For some Muslim consumers, avoiding certain products serves as a means of translating acceptance of the fatwa into everyday economic action. For other consumers, however, the same action may be driven primarily by humanitarian solidarity, anti-colonial nationalism, or ethical assessments of companies and products. Previous studies of Muslim consumers in Indonesia have likewise demonstrated that boycott decisions cannot be explained by a single factor but emerge from the interaction of various social, psychological, and religious considerations.⁵⁴ In the context of Palestine, boycotting enables consumers to connect micro-level consumption decisions with broader transnational political issues, making the market an arena for expressing moral and political positions beyond formal channels of political participation. The distinctive feature of the case of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 lies in the presence of religious authority that provides a normative orientation for such actions. However, the relationship between the fatwa and boycotting does not operate mechanically as a relationship between norm and compliance. Two different consumers may engage in the same action for different reasons, while two

⁵¹ Interviews with Muslim community members and Muslim business actors in Surabaya, Jakarta Special Capital Region, Bandung, Tangerang, South Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok, Serang, Bogor, Cirebon City, Cirebon Regency, Kuningan Regency, and Majalengka Regency, March 10–20, 2025.

⁵² Husna et al., "Public Chaos," 143–58; Amin et al., "Problematic Fatwa," 237–52; Manzoor Ahmed Kalwar et al., "Aqīdah in the Digital Age: Social Media, Religious Authority, and an Islamic Legal Framework," *Uhlul Albab: Jurnal Studi dan Penelitian Hukum Islam* 9, no. 2 (May 2026): 192–211.

⁵³ Soleh Hasan Wahid, Anjar Kususiyanah, and Fuady Abdullah, "Strengthening the Trust and Authority of Fatwa Institutions in the Digital Era: Lessons from Indonesia," *Journal of College of Sharia and Islamic Studies* 43, no. 2 (2025): 281–313; Mualimin et al., "Are Fatwas Visible on New Media? Dissemination of the Fatwas of the Indonesian Ulama Council on Instagram," *El-Mashlahab* 15, no. 1 (June 2025): 21–40; Moh Nor Ichwan, Mustaqim Pabbajah, and Faizal Amin, "Digitization of Religious Tafsir: The Fading of Indonesian Ulama Authority in Post Truth Era," *Jurnal Studi Ilmu-Ilmu Al-Qur'an dan Hadis* 25, no. 2 (September 2024): 320–45.

⁵⁴ Sari, Mizerski, and Liu, "Boycotting Foreign Products," 16–34; Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti, "Politics in the Supermarket," 245–69.

consumers who equally accept the normative objectives of the fatwa may demonstrate different levels of implementation. Thus, the fatwa acquires social force through recognition, socialization, and translation into action. Its realization, however, continues to take place within a social space shaped by identity, information, market conditions, and individual considerations.

Negotiating Authority and Variations in Consumer Compliance

The findings presented in the preceding section demonstrate that acceptance of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 and support for the boycott do not necessarily produce uniform patterns of action. The research data indicate that some informants who accept the normative objectives of the fatwa continue to consume certain products perceived to be affiliated with Israel, while others avoid only particular products or engage in boycotting when adequate alternatives are available.⁵⁵ This pattern is particularly evident among those who provide passive support, namely individuals who accept the moral objectives of the fatwa but do not consistently translate them into consumption practices. These findings reveal a gap between normative acceptance and behavioral implementation. This gap does not necessarily indicate rejection of the authority of the fatwa. Rather, when religious norms enter the sphere of consumption, their implementation encounters various material and practical conditions that shape everyday economic decisions. Compliance with the normative orientation of the fatwa is therefore better understood as a negotiated process rather than an automatic consequence of accepting religious authority. From the perspective of legitimate authority, recognition of an authority's legitimacy may provide an orientation for action, but it does not, by itself, produce uniform forms or levels of empirical compliance.⁵⁶

Product price and quality are two recurring considerations in informants' accounts of the difficulties involved in maintaining consistent boycott practices. Some informants expressed a willingness to switch to alternative products as long as those products were available at affordable prices and were perceived to offer comparable quality. Conversely, when alternative products were perceived as more expensive or failed to meet expected quality standards, consistently avoiding certain products became more difficult to sustain.⁵⁷ These findings demonstrate that consumption decisions constitute a space in which normative commitments intersect with material considerations.⁵⁸ Consumers may accept the moral message of the fatwa while simultaneously taking purchasing power, product functionality, and household needs into account when determining their actual behavior. This finding is consistent with Witro, who demonstrates that responses to products

⁵⁵ Interviews with Muslim community members, Muslim business actors, distributors, and representatives of business associations in Surabaya, Jakarta Special Capital Region, Bandung, Tangerang, South Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok, Serang, Bogor, Cirebon City, Cirebon Regency, Kuningan Regency, and Majalengka Regency, March 10–20, 2025.

⁵⁶ Weber, *Economy and Society*, 2:212–15.

⁵⁷ Interviews with Muslim community members, Muslim business actors, distributors, and representatives of business associations in Surabaya, Jakarta Special Capital Region, Bandung, Tangerang, South Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok, Serang, Bogor, Cirebon City, Cirebon Regency, Kuningan Regency, and Majalengka Regency, March 10–20, 2025.

⁵⁸ Fadhilah Fadhilah et al., "How to Build Online Consumer Trust in an Islamic Perspective Through TikTok Live Streaming Shopping," *Al-Muamalat* 11, no. 1 (January 2024): 59–74.

perceived to be affiliated with Israel are shaped by the intersection of religious values, humanitarian solidarity, information, political awareness, and economic considerations.⁵⁹ Studies of Muslim consumer boycott behavior in Indonesia likewise indicate that religiosity is not the sole determinant of boycott behavior but interacts with attitudes, consumption experiences, and various other socio-economic considerations.⁶⁰

Beyond price and quality, the availability of alternative products and established consumption habits also shape variations in the implementation of the fatwa. Interview findings indicate that some informants found it difficult to avoid products that had become part of their everyday needs and consumption routines, particularly when substitutes were difficult to find or were perceived as lacking comparable functionality and quality. Conversely, when alternatives were available and easily accessible, switching consumption patterns was relatively more feasible.⁶¹ These conditions indicate that a change in normative orientation does not necessarily eliminate previously established consumption patterns. Consumers' relationships with particular products are shaped not only by immediate purchasing decisions but also by usage experience, brand familiarity, distribution access, and household routines. This finding is consistent with previous studies showing that Muslim consumer boycott behavior in Indonesia is shaped by the interaction of multiple factors and cannot be reduced to religiosity or normative attitudes alone.⁶² In this study, the availability of alternatives constitutes an important condition that enables normative orientations to be translated into more consistent changes in consumption. Thus, the capacity of a fatwa to orient action depends not only on recognition of its legitimacy but also on the structure of opportunities that enables consumers to translate such normative orientations into everyday practices.

Variations in implementation become increasingly complex because consumers do not always have sufficiently reliable information about which products should be avoided. The interview and FGD findings indicate that the absence of an official list of products affiliated with Israel has led some members of the public to rely on information circulated through social media and various digital channels. This condition creates difficulties in distinguishing products whose affiliations can be verified from those merely associated with Israel through information circulating in the public sphere.⁶³ A similar issue was identified by Husna et al.,

⁵⁹ Witro, "State Islamic University Students' Perceptions of Israel Affiliated Products," 145–60.

⁶⁰ Sari, Mizerski, and Liu, "Boycotting Foreign Products," 16–34; Roswinanto and Suwanda, "Religious Boycott in Indonesia," 174–95.

⁶¹ Interviews with Muslim community members, Muslim business actors, distributors, and representatives of business associations in Surabaya, Jakarta Special Capital Region, Bandung, Tangerang, South Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok, Serang, Bogor, Cirebon City, Cirebon Regency, Kuningan Regency, and Majalengka Regency, March 10–20, 2025.

⁶² Megawati Simanjuntak et al., "Drivers of Boycott and Switching Behaviour toward Israeli-Affiliated Products: The Roles of Religiosity, Social Media, Animosity, and Ethnocentrism," *Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* 34 (2026): 21–48; Wirawan Setialaksana et al., "Extending the Theory of Planned Behaviour in Islamic Consumer Boycotts: The Mediating Role of Religious Animosity, Emotions and Boycott-Specific Self-Efficacy," *Journal of Islamic Marketing*, 2026, 1–22.

⁶³ Interviews with Muslim community members, Muslim business actors, distributors, and representatives of business associations in Surabaya, Jakarta Special Capital Region, Bandung, Tangerang, South Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok, Serang, Bogor, Cirebon City, Cirebon Regency, Kuningan Regency, and Majalengka Regency, March 10–20, 2025.

who found public confusion regarding the products targeted for boycott, while Amin et al. highlighted the lack of clear criteria that may create difficulties in implementing the MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023.⁶⁴ Such uncertainty has direct implications for consumer behavior: a norm may be accepted, but its implementation becomes uncertain when individuals lack adequate information to determine the objects toward which their actions should be directed. Under these conditions, some consumers choose to avoid only products whose affiliations they consider credible, while others refrain from taking action when the available information is deemed insufficiently convincing. This issue demonstrates that the effectiveness of norm implementation depends not only on acceptance of its substantive content but also on the availability of credible information capable of translating general normative categories into concrete objects of action.⁶⁵

These findings help explain why the categories of active support, passive support, and neutrality identified in the preceding section should not be understood as fixed categories. Rather, they are more appropriately interpreted as variations in consumers' positions in translating normative orientations into action. A consumer may consistently avoid one category of products while continuing to use other products because no adequate alternatives are available. Another consumer may engage in boycotting when presented with information considered credible but refrain from taking action when a product's affiliation is unclear. Even for the same individual, the level of implementation may change in response to price, product accessibility, personal needs, established consumption habits, and the information available. This study refers to this pattern as selective compliance, namely a condition in which recognition of a normative orientation remains present, but its translation into action occurs partially and contextually in response to the conditions faced by consumers. A similar pattern was identified in a study of social ambivalence toward Islam Nusantara, which demonstrates a distinction between acceptance of religious practices and acceptance of the normative categories associated with them.⁶⁶ Accordingly, variations in behavior should not be interpreted simplistically as a failure of fatwa authority. Rather, they represent a process of negotiation between normative demands and the social and material conditions within which those norms are enacted, resulting in forms of selective compliance.⁶⁷

Transformation of Consumer Preferences and Market Reorientation toward Domestic Products

The negotiation between normative orientations and consumption conditions, as discussed in the preceding section, not only produces variations in the implementation of boycotts but also encourages processes of product substitution. The research data indicate that some

⁶⁴ Husna et al., "Public Chaos," 143–58; Amin et al., "Problematic Fatwa," 237–52.


⁶⁵ Nadia, Arif, and Turobovich, "Sharia Legal Certainty in Boycotts," 19–37; Rachmadhani, "An Analysis Study of the Fatwa Indonesia Ulama Council (MUI) on Boycotting Israel Products with the I'tibār al-Maālāt Theoretical Approach," 39–55.

⁶⁶ Andri Ashadi et al., "Practice Acceptance and Label Rejection: Social Ambivalence toward Islam Nusantara in Minangkabau, Indonesia," *International Journal of Islamic Khazanah* 16, no. 1 (May 2026): 16–35.

⁶⁷ Sari, Mizerski, and Liu, "Boycotting Foreign Products," 16–34; Husna et al., "Public Chaos," 143–58; Reslawati Reslawati, R. Adang Nofandi, and Ahsanul Khalikin, "Barriers to Halal Certification among Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises in Makassar: Financial, Digital, and Governance Perspectives," *Syariah: Jurnal Hukum dan Pemikiran* 25, no. 2 (December 2025): 345–58.

informants who reduced or discontinued their consumption of products perceived to be affiliated with Israel did not necessarily reduce their consumption of the same product categories. Instead, they sought alternative products that they considered more compatible with their moral and religious considerations as well as their practical needs.⁶⁸ In this context, boycotting operates through two interconnected forms of action: avoiding particular products and shifting preferences toward alternative products.⁶⁹ This pattern indicates that the social implications of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 extend beyond the avoidance of particular products and also involve a reorientation of consumer preferences. Interviews with business actors indicate that the search for substitute products is perceived as creating opportunities for local products and MSMEs as consumers seek alternatives to products they choose to avoid.⁷⁰ These findings do not, by themselves, establish an overall transformation in market structure. Rather, they indicate a shift in consumer-level choices that connects boycott practices with preferences for alternative products.

Figure 4
Respondents' Preference for Domestic Products over Global Products
Perceived to Be Affiliated with Israel



Source: Survey data processed by the authors, 2025.

This tendency is reflected in the survey findings concerning preferences for domestic products over global products perceived to be affiliated with Israel. A total of 43.7% of respondents strongly agreed and 51.1% agreed that they would choose domestic products. Thus, 94.8% of the respondents in this study expressed a positive tendency toward this choice, while 4.2% disagreed and 1.0% strongly disagreed. These findings cannot be statistically generalized as representative of all Indonesian consumers because the study

⁶⁸ Interviews with Muslim and non-Muslim community members and Muslim and non-Muslim business actors in Surabaya, Jakarta Special Capital Region, Bandung, Tangerang, South Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok, Serang, Bogor, Cirebon City, Cirebon Regency, Kuningan Regency, and Majalengka Regency, March 10–20, 2025.

⁶⁹ Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti, “Politics in the Supermarket,” 245–69; Kam and Deichert, “Boycotting, Buycotting, and the Psychology of Political Consumerism,” 72–88.

⁷⁰ Interviews with Muslim community members, Muslim business actors, distributors, and representatives of business associations in Surabaya, Jakarta Special Capital Region, Bandung, Tangerang, South Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok, Serang, Bogor, Cirebon City, Cirebon Regency, Kuningan Regency, and Majalengka Regency, March 10–20, 2025.

employed non-probability purposive sampling. However, among the 975 respondents surveyed, the data indicate a strong orientation toward positioning domestic products as alternatives in the context of the boycott. This pattern is consistent with research on the willingness of young Indonesian consumers to purchase local products amid boycott movements, which shows that such choices may intersect with religious values and consumer ethnocentrism.⁷¹ Accordingly, preferences for domestic products should not be understood merely as a consequence of avoiding particular products, but also as a form of affirmative consumption through which consumers redirect their choices toward products perceived to be more compatible with their values and considerations.

Table 3
Respondents' Preferences for Alternative Brands and Brands Targeted in the Israel-Related Boycott Discourse

Product Category	Brand	Number of Respondents	Percentage	Position in the Context of the Boycott
Mineral Water	Le Minerale	720	73.8%	Domestic alternative; not included in the public list used in this study
	AQUA	282	28.9%	Included in the public list of products described as “pro-Israel”
	Crystalline	225	23.1%	Not included in the public list used in this study
	Nestlé	89	9.1%	Included in the public list of products described as “pro-Israel”
Fast Food	Sabana	524	53.7%	Domestic alternative; not included in the public list used in this study
	d’Besto	410	42.1%	Domestic alternative; not included in the public list used in this study
	KFC	218	22.4%	Included in the public list of products described as “pro-Israel”
	McDonald’s	146	15.0%	Included in the public list; boycott campaign also supported by BDS

Source: Survey data processed by the authors, 2025.

This tendency toward substitution becomes more concrete when respondents’ preferences are examined in relation to product categories and the information environment developing in the public sphere. The MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 itself does not identify specific companies or brands that should be avoided. The fatwa stipulates that supporting Israeli aggression against Palestine or parties that support Israel, whether directly or indirectly, is *haram*, while avoiding transactions with and the use of products affiliated with

⁷¹ Rina Herani and Jovita Angela, “For Palestine or for Us Too? Examining Indonesian Youth’s Willingness to Buy Local Products amid the Israel Boycott,” *Journal of Islamic Marketing* 16, no. 7 (December 2024): 1880–903.

Israel and supporting colonialism and Zionism is presented as a recommendation.⁷² Following the issuance of the fatwa, various unofficial lists of products described as “pro-Israel” have circulated through social media and digital platforms. One such list circulating in the Indonesian public sphere includes, among others, AQUA, Nestlé, KFC, and McDonald’s.⁷³ Because the MUI has never officially issued such a list,⁷⁴ it is used in this study only as a discursive artifact that illustrates the information environment through which consumers identify and interpret boycott targets. In the case of McDonald’s, there is stronger supporting documentation because the Palestinian BDS National Committee has endorsed a boycott campaign against the company and placed it within the category of a grassroots organic boycott target.⁷⁵

Table 3 illustrates differences in respondents’ preferences between selected domestic products and brands featured in the public discourse on Israel-related boycotts. In the mineral water category, Le Minerale was the most preferred brand, selected by 73.8% of respondents, while AQUA and Nestlé, which are included in an unofficial list of products described as “pro-Israel,” were selected by 28.9% and 9.1% of respondents, respectively. A more pronounced pattern is observed in the fast-food category. Sabana was selected by 53.7% of respondents and d’Besto by 42.1%, while KFC was selected by 22.4% and McDonald’s by 15.0%. These differences cannot be interpreted as evidence that MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 directly caused consumers to shift from these brands to domestic products. However, when considered alongside interview findings concerning the avoidance of products perceived to be associated with Israel and the search for substitute products, the data provide an indication of the direction of consumption substitution. Accordingly, the findings suggest that the normative orientation of the fatwa enters the market through processes of social interpretation. General normative categories are translated by consumers into concrete brands and products through information circulating in the public sphere and are subsequently negotiated against the availability of alternatives before being expressed in consumption choices.

This reorientation of consumer choices also creates economic opportunities for MSMEs and domestic businesses. The research data indicate that some MSME actors perceive the search for alternative products as an opportunity to expand their markets, particularly in the food, beverage, household industry, and culinary sectors. Some business actors also reported increased demand as consumers began seeking alternatives to products they chose to avoid. This finding resonates with previous research showing that boycott movements can coexist with Indonesian consumers’ willingness to choose local products.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, these findings cannot be extended to claim that MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023

⁷² “Fatwa MUI No. 83 of 2023 on the Islamic Legal Ruling on Support for the Palestinian Struggle.”

⁷³ Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital, “[HOAKS] Rilis Daftar 121 Produk Yang Diharamkan MUI Karena Terafiliasi Israel.”

⁷⁴ SAH, “Chair of the MUI Commission for Foreign Relations and International Cooperation, Statement during a Focus Group Discussion.”

⁷⁵ BDS Movement, “Guide to BDS Boycott & Pressure Corporate Priority Targeting,” December 6, 2024, <https://bdsmovement.net/Guide-to-BDS-Boycott>.

⁷⁶ Herani and Angela, “For Palestine or for Us Too?,” 1880–903; Sari, Mizerski, and Liu, “Boycotting Foreign Products,” 16–34.

has caused aggregate growth in MSMEs or domestic industries. However, interviews with ISS indicate that the accommodation, food, and beverage sector grew by 8.56%, the market value of Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) increased by approximately 7%, and the market size of food service was reported to have grown by approximately 13% per year in 2024.⁷⁷ These substitution preferences indicate that boycott and substitution practices have unfolded within a domestic consumption sector that continued to expand, although they do not establish a direct causal relationship between the fatwa and economic growth.

Overall, the findings of this study indicate that the social efficacy of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 does not operate through a linear relationship between norms and compliance. Rather, it unfolds through a process in which normative authority gains legitimacy, orients action, and is subsequently translated through processes of interpretation and negotiation in consumption practices. This finding extends scholarship that positions fatwas as a medium for articulating religious authority,⁷⁸ while also complementing studies on the legal construction of fatwas and the diverse factors shaping public responses.⁷⁹ From the perspective of legitimate authority, legitimacy enables an authority to orient action without relying on direct coercion, but recognition of legitimacy does not deterministically produce uniform compliance.⁸⁰ When entering the sphere of consumption, the normative orientation of the fatwa interacts with humanitarian solidarity, religious considerations, anti-colonial nationalism, price and quality, consumption habits, the availability of alternatives, and the reliability of information concerning boycott targets. Accordingly, the social efficacy of a fatwa as a form of non-state Islamic legal norm cannot be adequately assessed solely through the dichotomy of compliance and non-compliance. It should also be assessed in terms of its capacity to introduce normative considerations into decision-making processes. In this context, the market becomes an arena where Islamic legal authority intersects with political consumerism, as religious legitimacy transforms transnational solidarity into everyday economic actions, all mediated by social, material, and informational conditions.⁸¹

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that the social efficacy of MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 derives not primarily from the coercive force of state law, but from the normative legitimacy that enables the fatwa to gain recognition and serve as one of the orientations informing consumer decision-making. The quantitative and qualitative findings indicate that such recognition does not produce uniform compliance. The fatwa translates solidarity with Palestine into the sphere of economic action by encouraging greater selectivity in consumption, avoidance of

⁷⁷ ISS, "Director General of Domestic Trade, Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia, Statement during a Focus Group Discussion."

⁷⁸ Kaptein, "The Voice of the 'Ulamâ'," 115–30; Lindsey, "Monopolising Islam," 253–74.

⁷⁹ Anam and Sulaeman, "Law, Ethics, and Hadith Ahkam," 1023–53; Witro, "State Islamic University Students' Perceptions of Israel Affiliated Products," 145–60; Sari, Mizerski, and Liu, "Boycotting Foreign Products," 16–34.

⁸⁰ Weber, *Economy and Society*, 2:212–16; Nurhasanah Nurhasanah et al., "Challenges in Implementing Indonesia's Halal Product Assurance Law: An Analysis of Legal Uncertainty, Supervisory Systems, and Legal Culture," *Nurani: Jurnal Kajian Syari'ah dan Masyarakat* 25, no. 2 (December 2025): 599–619.

⁸¹ Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti, "Politics in the Supermarket," 245–69; Kam and Deichert, "Boycotting, Buycotting, and the Psychology of Political Consumerism," 72–88.

products perceived to be affiliated with Israel, and the search for substitute products, including domestically produced goods. However, the translation of this normative orientation into action occurs through processes of interpretation and negotiation shaped by religious motivations, humanitarian solidarity, anti-colonial nationalism, product price and quality, consumption habits, the availability of alternatives, and the reliability of information concerning the targets of the boycott. These conditions produce a spectrum of responses, ranging from active and passive support to neutrality, including what this study refers to as selective compliance. Thus, the relationship between fatwas and consumer behavior is not linear. Rather, it operates through a sequence of normative authority, recognition of legitimacy, behavioral orientation, interpretation of the target of the norm, and negotiation of contextual conditions, which together produce variations in individual action. These findings further demonstrate that markets can serve as arenas in which non-state Islamic legal norms acquire social force and interact with practices of political consumerism.

The primary contribution of this article to the study of Islamic law lies in demonstrating that the social efficacy of a fatwa cannot be adequately assessed solely through the dichotomy of compliance and non-compliance. It should instead be understood in terms of its capacity to shape normative orientations that enter the decision-making process, even when their translation into action varies across consumers. By applying Max Weber's concept of legitimate authority to MUI's religious authority, this study demonstrates that legitimacy and compliance are related but not identical dimensions. Legitimacy enables a fatwa to orient action without guaranteeing uniform implementation. This perspective extends the study of fatwas beyond doctrinal analyses of their legal content and foundations toward a socio-legal analysis of how Islamic legal norms acquire social force, operate within social and economic life, and encounter the limits of their effectiveness. At the same time, the findings on product substitution indicate that the implications of a fatwa may extend beyond the religious sphere and enter market mechanisms through changes in consumer preferences. Nevertheless, this study does not establish a causal relationship between the fatwa and changes in market share or the growth of domestic industries. Given the use of purposive sampling and the geographical scope of the study, the findings are not intended to provide statistical representation of all consumers in Indonesia. Future research should therefore examine the mechanisms of legitimacy, orientation, negotiation, and action across broader populations and contexts. Longitudinal studies are also required to examine how fatwa authority interacts over time with shifts in information ecosystems, consumer behavior, and market dynamics.

Bibliography

- Amin, Abd Rauf Muhammad, Abdul Syatar, Mayyadah Mayyadah, Achmad Abubakar, and Islamul Haq. "Problematic Fatwa: An In-Depth Sociological Investigation of MUI's Fatwa on Supporting Palestine's Struggle." *El-Usrah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga* 7, no. 1 (July 2024): 237–52. <https://doi.org/10.22373/ujhk.v7i1.22020>.
- Anam, Wahidul, and Mubaidi Sulaeman. "Law, Ethics, and Hadith Ahkam: An Analysis of Fatwa MUI in the Perspective of Progressive Interpretation." *Samarah: Jurnal Hukum*

- Keluarga dan Hukum Islam* 8, no. 2 (June 2024): 1023–53. <https://doi.org/10.22373/sjhk.v8i2.21594>.
- Andriani, Astri Dwi, and Irfan Sophan Himawan. “Global Brand Narratives Amidst Pro-Palestinian Boycotts: A Critical Discourse Analysis in Southeast Asia.” *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication* 41, no. 2 (2025): 384–404. <https://doi.org/10.17576/JKMJC-2025-4102-22>.
- Andriansyah, Yuli. “Analysis of Fatwas by the National Sharia Board-Indonesian Council of Ulama on the Stock Market.” *Millah: Journal of Religious Studies* 22, no. 2 (2023): 525–52. <https://doi.org/10.20885/millah.vol22.iss2.art9>.
- Arisandy, Danil Putra, Asmuni, and Muhammad Syukri Albani Nasution. “The Majelis Ulama’s Fatwa on Freedom of Expression on Social Media: The Perspective of Maqashid Sharia.” *Al-Istinbath: Jurnal Hukum Islam* 7, no. 2 (2022): 467–86. <https://doi.org/10.29240/jhi.v7i2.5235>.
- Ashadi, Andri, Wakidul Kohar, Sefriyono Sefriyono, Sarwan Sarwan, and Danil Folandra. “Practice Acceptance and Label Rejection: Social Ambivalence toward Islam Nusantara in Minangkabau, Indonesia.” *International Journal of Islamic Khazanah* 16, no. 1 (May 2026): 16–35. <https://doi.org/10.15575/ijik.v16i1.51443>.
- Bakan, Abigail B., and Yasmeen Abu-Laban. “Palestinian Resistance and International Solidarity: The BDS Campaign.” *Race & Class* 51, no. 1 (July 2009): 29–54. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396809106162>.
- Basya, Nabilah Tsuroya. “Reading MUI Fatwa No. 83 of 2023 on the Ruling of Supporting the Palestina: Maslahat Perspective.” *Jurnal Mediasas: Media Ilmu Syari’ah dan Ahwal Al-Syakhsyiyah* 7, no. 1 (June 2024): 69–83. <https://doi.org/10.58824/mediasas.v7i1.109>.
- Baumgart-Ochse, Claudia. “Claiming Justice for Israel/Palestine: The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) Campaign and Christian Organizations.” *Globalizations* 14, no. 7 (November 2017): 1172–87. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2017.1310463>.
- BDS Movement. “Guide to BDS Boycott & Pressure Corporate Priority Targeting.” December 6, 2024. <https://bdsmovement.net/Guide-to-BDS-Boycott>.
- Braun, Virginia, and Victoria Clarke. “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology.” *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3, no. 2 (January 2006): 77–101. <https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa>.
- Budiwanti, Erni, and Levi Geir Eidhamar. “The State and Religion in Indonesia: The Indonesian Ulama Council’s Authority on Public Health and National Lottery.” *Religions* 17, no. 1 (January 2026): 72. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel17010072>.
- Creswell, John W., and Vicki L. Plano Clark. *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2018.
- Fadhilah, Fadhilah, Galih Ginanjar Saputra, Tri Wahyudi, and Muhamad Fakhruddin. “How to Build Online Consumer Trust in an Islamic Perspective Through TikTok Live Streaming Shopping.” *Al-Muamalat* 11, no. 1 (January 2024): 59–74. <https://doi.org/10.15575/am.v11i1.33794>.
- Faiz, Muhammad Fauzinudin, Arifki Budia Warman, M. Syamsul Huda, Agus Aditoni, Yassine Chami, Haris Maiza Putra, and Wildan Miftahusurur. “Fatwa and the Sound Horeg Question: Contesting Rights, Noise, and Social Order in East Java, Indonesia.”

- Al-'Adalah* 23, no. 1 (June 2026): 121–46.
<https://doi.org/10.24042/adalah.v23i1.28148>.
- Falah, Mohammad Bachrul, and Riyanta Riyanta. “Digital Patriarchy: How Indonesian Islamic Preachers Construct Gender Asymmetry through YouTube Fatwas.” *Al-Ahwal: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga Islam* 18, no. 1 (June 2025): 103–22.
<https://doi.org/10.14421/ahwal.2025.18106>.
- Gammoh, Leen Adel, Nadine Khair, and Rand Gammoh. “Consumer Boycotts, Ethical Risk and Cultural Resistance: A Sustainability Perspective on Western Fast-Food Consumption in Jordan.” *Management and Sustainability*, 2026, 1–25.
<https://doi.org/10.1108/MSAR-01-2026-0007>.
- Greening, Lara J., David Young, Lee De-Wit, and Lucia A. Reisch. “The Political Psychology Behind Consumer Decisions: The Complex Relationship Between Political Ideology and Political Consumerism.” *Journal of Consumer Behaviour* 25, no. 4 (2026): 2178–92.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/cb.70165>.
- Gulen, Ertem, and Oguzhan Aygoren. “Understanding Political Consumerism, Political Participation, and Their Antecedents: Evidence from Turkey.” In *Research Anthology on Citizen Engagement and Activism for Social Change*, 848–70. IGI Global, 2021.
<https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-6684-3706-3.ch045>.
- Hafizd, Jefik Zulfikar, Tajul Arifin, Hasan Bisri, and Dedah Jubaedah. “Reassessing Justice in Murabahah Regulation in Indonesia through Sayyid Qutb’s Perspective.” *International Journal of Islamic Khasanah* 16, no. 1 (June 2026): 36–54.
<https://doi.org/10.15575/ijik.v16i1.54103>.
- Hamim, Khairul, Lalu Supriadi Bin Mujib, and Ahmad Muhasim. “Religious Fatwā and Human Security: Managing Public Health through the Lens of Islamic Jurisprudence in Indonesia and Saudi Arabia.” *Khasanah Hukum* 6, no. 3 (2024): 234–50.
<https://doi.org/10.15575/KH.V6I3.40478>.
- Hardiyanto, Sigit, Faisal Eriza, Hatta Ridho, Faisal Fadilla Noorikhsan, Dimas Agustian, and Putri Evi Oviyanti Batubara. “Analysis of the Fatwa of the Indonesian Ulema Council Supporting Halal Certification and the Progress of Indonesian Muslims.” *Pharos Journal of Theology* 105, no. 1 (2024): 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.46222/pharosjot.10521>.
- Hayati, Ilda, Busman Edyar, Desfitranita, Busahdiar, and Juliansyah. “Contextualizing Fatwas amid Social Change: A Maqasid-Based Comparative Framework of Legal Reasoning in MUI, Muhammadiyah, and Nahdlatul Ulama.” *Al-Istinbath: Jurnal Hukum Islam* 11, no. 2 (2026): 494–522. <https://doi.org/10.29240/jhi.v11i2.15361>.
- Herani, Rina. “When Authority Stays Mute, What Drives the Substitute? Investigating Youth Voluntary Compliance with a Fatwa amid Geopolitical Tensions.” *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, December 23, 2025, 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSSP-03-2025-0151>.
- Herani, Rina, and Jovita Angela. “For Palestine or for Us Too? Examining Indonesian Youth’s Willingness to Buy Local Products amid the Israel Boycott.” *Journal of Islamic Marketing* 16, no. 7 (December 2024): 1880–903. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JIMA-05-2024-0205>.
- Husna, Nurul, Andi Farahdhiba Irfan, Budi Juliandi, Saifuddin Herlambang, and Fadhlunasyifa Fadhlunasyifa. “Public Chaos: Alleged Fatwa on Boycotting and the

- Fear of Missing Out on Israeli Products in Indonesia.” *AHKAM: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah* 25, no. 1 (December 2025): 143–58. <https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v25i1.41588>.
- Ichsan, Nurul, Rakha Mulia Gymnastiar, and Maria Zehra. “Review of the Success of Collecting Donations for Palestine through Kitabisa.Com.” *Al-Muamalat* 12, no. 1 (April 2025): 198–210. <https://doi.org/10.15575/am.v12i1.44059>.
- Ichwan, Moh Nor, Mustaqim Pabbajah, and Faizal Amin. “Digitization of Religious Tafsir: The Fading of Indonesian Ulama Authority in Post Truth Era.” *Jurnal Studi Ilmu-Ilmu Al-Qur’an dan Hadis* 25, no. 2 (September 2024): 320–45. <https://doi.org/10.14421/qh.v25i2.5545>.
- Ihsan, Muhammad Alim, Sakaruddin Mandjarreki, and Suparman Suparman. “Religion as Moral Infrastructure: Lived Islam, Welfare Governance, and the Family Hope Program in Indonesia.” *Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama dan Lintas Budaya* 9, no. 3 (December 2025): 347–64. <https://doi.org/10.15575/rjsalb.v9i3.47226>.
- Izudin, Ahmad. “Green Fatwa Studies in Global Discourses: Trends and Pathways for the Sustainable Development Agenda.” *Asy-Syir’ab: Jurnal Ilmu Syari’ah dan Hukum* 60, no. 1 (May 2026): 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajish.v60i1.1685>.
- Kalwar, Manzoor Ahmed, Danyal Ahmad, Hafiza Sana Rehman Khan, and Najmul Sahar Ilyas. “Aqīdah in the Digital Age: Social Media, Religious Authority, and an Islamic Legal Framework.” *Ulul Albab: Jurnal Studi dan Penelitian Hukum Islam* 9, no. 2 (May 2026): 192–211. <https://doi.org/10.30659/jua.v9i2.51261>.
- Kam, Cindy D., and Maggie Deichert. “Boycotting, Buycotting, and the Psychology of Political Consumerism.” *The Journal of Politics* 82, no. 1 (January 2020): 72–88. <https://doi.org/10.1086/705922>.
- Kaptein, Nico J. G. “The Voice of the ‘Ulamā’: Fatwas and Religious Authority in Indonesia.” *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 125 (2004): 115–30. <https://doi.org/10.4000/assr.1038>.
- Kasdi, Abdurrohman, Umma Farida, Miftahul Huda, Akmal Fawwaz Aulia Rahman, and Ahmad Dakhoir. “Fatwa and Religious Authority: Islamic Law, Social Media Ethics and Digital Age.” *Al-Abkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syari’ah dan Hukum* 11, no. 1 (March 2026): 56–66. <https://doi.org/10.22515/alahkam.v11i1.10755>.
- Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital. “[HOAKS] Rilis Daftar 121 Produk Yang Diharamkan MUI Karena Terafiliasi Israel.” November 17, 2023. <https://www.komdigi.go.id/berita/berita-hoaks/detail/hoaks-rilis-daftar-121-produk-yang-diharamkan-mui-karena-terafiliasi-israel>.
- Khan, Mohd Azmi, and Amgad S. D. Khaled. “Religion-Based Boycott Behavior through the Lens of the Theory of Planned Behavior: Insights from Gen Z Muslims.” *Cogent Business & Management* 13, no. 1 (June 2026): 2689830. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2026.2689830>.
- Kumar, Rajesh, Debasis Neogi, Prasoon M. Tripathi, and Dayanand Pandey, eds. *Geoeconomics of the Israel–Palestine Conflict: Governance, Global Trade, and Regional Dynamics*. London: Routledge, 2025. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003512424>.
- Lahuri, Setiawan bin, Alfi Khilmi Khusnia, Yulizar Djamaluddin Sanrego, Khoirul Umam, and Muchammad Taufiq Affandi. “A Normative Analysis of DSN-MUI Fatwa No. 154/DSN-MUI/V/2023 and Its Implications for Sharia ETF Governance in

- Indonesia.” *Al-Muamalat* 13, no. 1 (March 2026): 50–75. <https://doi.org/10.15575/am.v13i1.52282>.
- Lindsey, Tim. “Monopolising Islam: The Indonesian Ulama Council and State Regulation of the ‘Islamic Economy.’” *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 48, no. 2 (August 2012): 253–74. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2012.694157>.
- Majelis Ulama Indonesia. “Fatwa Terbaru MUI Nomor 83 Tahun 2023: Mendukung Agresi Israel ke Palestina Hukumnya Haram.” November 10, 2023. <https://mui.or.id/baca/berita/fatwa-terbaru-mui-nomor-83-tahun-2023-mendukung-agresi-israel-ke-palestina-hukumnya-haram>.
- Mualimin, Mustafa Oztunc, Aytekin Isman, Ari Yunaldi, Sri Sudono Saliro, Anton Widodo, and Nana Abdul Aziz. “Are Fatwas Visible on New Media? Dissemination of the Fatwas of the Indonesian Ulama Council on Instagram.” *El-Mashlahah* 15, no. 1 (June 2025): 21–40. <https://doi.org/10.23971/el-mashlahah.v15i1.7879>.
- Muniron, Muniron, Fidias Astuti, and Faiz Marikar. “Lived Social Sufism beyond Institutions: Non-Institutional Charismatic Authority in Contemporary Indonesian Islam.” *Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama dan Lintas Budaya* 9, no. 3 (December 2025): 257–72. <https://doi.org/10.15575/rjsalb.v9i3.46756>.
- Nadia, Ahmad Arif, and Juraev Abror Turobovich. “Sharia Legal Certainty in Boycotts: Assessing the Implications of Fatwas on Socio-Economic Justice.” *Mazhabuna: Jurnal Perbandingan Mazhab* 7, no. 1 (2025): 19–37. <https://doi.org/10.24252/mazhabuna.vi.52254>.
- Nurhasanah, Nurhasanah, Umar Al Haddad, Mohd Zaidi Daud, Bintan Dzumirroh Ariny, and Lucy Laksmi. “Challenges in Implementing Indonesia’s Halal Product Assurance Law: An Analysis of Legal Uncertainty, Supervisory Systems, and Legal Culture.” *Nurani: Jurnal Kajian Syari’ah dan Masyarakat* 25, no. 2 (December 2025): 599–619. <https://doi.org/10.19109/nurani.v25i2.28633>.
- Ozamiz-Etxebarria, Naiara, Nahia Idoaga-Mondragon, Maitane Picaza Gorrotxategi, Idoia Legorburu Fernandez, and Itziar Kerexeta Brazal. “Resistance, Suffering and Political Critique: Social Representations of the Palestinian Conflict in Student Discourses.” *Social Sciences* 15, no. 7 (July 2026): 416. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci15070416>.
- Rachmadhani, Fajar. “An Analysis Study of the Fatwa Indonesia Ulema Council (MUI) on Boycotting Israel Products with the I’tibār al-Maalāt Theoretical Approach.” *Journal of Fatwa Management and Research* 30, no. 3 (September 2025): 39–55. <https://doi.org/10.33102/jfatwa.vol30no3.705>.
- Reslawati, Reslawati, R. Adang Nofandi, and Ahsanul Khalikin. “Barriers to Halal Certification among Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises in Makassar: Financial, Digital, and Governance Perspectives.” *Syariah: Jurnal Hukum dan Pemikiran* 25, no. 2 (December 2025): 345–58. <https://doi.org/10.18592/sjhp.v25i2.18226>.
- Roswinanto, Widyarso, and Siti Nuraisyah Suwanda. “Religious Boycott in Indonesia: Investigation of Antecedents and the Effect of Religiosity Dimensions.” *Journal of Islamic Marketing* 14, no. 1 (August 2021): 174–95. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JIMA-08-2020-0246>.
- Samudra, Fawes, Akhmad Roja Badrus Zaman, and Digdo Aji Mukti. “Reviving the Essence of Jihad in the Contemporary Era: Advocating Struggle and Solidarity for Palestine

- Through Boycott of Pro-Israel Products.” *MILRev: Metro Islamic Law Review* 3, no. 1 (April 2024): 22–42. <https://doi.org/10.32332/milrev.v3i1.8971>.
- Sanuri, Sanuri, Masdar Hilmy, Nafi’ Mubarak, Imroatul Azizah, Yoga Irama, and Hidayatulloh Hidayatulloh. “A Maslahah-Based Review of MUI’s Fatwa on Cryptocurrency: A Cognizant Human Perspective.” *Syariah: Jurnal Hukum dan Pemikiran* 25, no. 1 (July 2025): 43–66. <https://doi.org/10.18592/sjhp.v25i1.16641>.
- Sari, Dessy Kurnia, Dick Mizerski, and Fang Liu. “Boycotting Foreign Products: A Study of Indonesian Muslim Consumers.” *Journal of Islamic Marketing* 8, no. 1 (March 2017): 16–34. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JIMA-12-2014-0078>.
- Setialaksana, Wirawan, Muhammad Romario Basirung, Abdul Syatar, Muhammad Asriadi, Irwansyah Suwahyu, and Rafsanjani Supardi. “Extending the Theory of Planned Behaviour in Islamic Consumer Boycotts: The Mediating Role of Religious Animosity, Emotions and Boycott-Specific Self-Efficacy.” *Journal of Islamic Marketing*, 2026, 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JIMA-04-2025-0257>.
- Simanjuntak, Megawati, Salsabila Azka Pelitaputri, Irni Rahmayani Johan, Ismayanti Pratiwi, Retnaningsih Retnaningsih, Mohamad Fazli Sabri, and Amirah Shazana Magli. “Drivers of Boycott and Switching Behaviour toward Israeli-Affiliated Products: The Roles of Religiosity, Social Media, Animosity, and Ethnocentrism.” *Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* 34 (2026): 21–48. <https://doi.org/10.47836/pjssh.34.S1.02>.
- Starke, Christopher, and Ole Kelm. “Political Consumerism.” In *Elgar Encyclopedia of Political Communication*, 3:212–15. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2025. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035301447.vol3.00055>.
- Stolle, Dietlind, Marc Hooghe, and Michele Micheletti. “Politics in the Supermarket: Political Consumerism as a Form of Political Participation.” *International Political Science Review* 26, no. 3 (July 2005): 245–69. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512105053784>.
- Wahid, Soleh Hasan, Anjar Kususiyanah, and Fuady Abdullah. “Strengthening the Trust and Authority of Fatwa Institutions in the Digital Era: Lessons from Indonesia.” *Journal of College of Sharia and Islamic Studies* 43, no. 2 (2025): 281–313. <https://doi.org/10.29117/jcsis.2025.0425>.
- Weber, Max. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Nachdr. Vol. 2, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Whyte, Shaheen. “Are Fatwas Dispensable? Examining the Contemporary Relevance and Authority of Fatwas in Australia.” *Oxford Journal of Law and Religion* 11, nos. 2–3 (October 2022): 314–42. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ojlr/rwac015>.
- Wibowo, Prihandono, Renitha Dwi Hapsari, and Muchammad Chasif Ascha. “Respon Publik Terhadap Fatwa Boikot Produk Israel Oleh Majelis Ulama Indonesia.” *Journal Publicho* 7, no. 1 (March 2024): 382–95. <https://doi.org/10.35817/publicuho.v7i1.371>.
- Witro, Doli. “State Islamic University Students’ Perceptions of Israel Affiliated Products: A Study After the Fatwa of Indonesian Ulama Council No. 83 of 2023 Concerning the Law on Support for the Palestinian Struggle.” *Al-Manabih: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam* 18, no. 1 (June 2024): 145–60. <https://doi.org/10.24090/mnh.v18i1.10554>.